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In this paper I examine Horace’s Epistles 1 and argue that Horace 
constructed the main speaker of this collection as a duplicitous ‘liar 
persona’. Horace’s persona of Epistles 1 admits that his past 
relationship with his patron Maecenas was paramount to slavery and 
appears determined to restore himself to freedom. Nevertheless, 
Horace employs various strategies to make us question the sincerity 
of his persona’s resolve and to suspect we may be being addressed 
by a slave dissimulating as a free man. Furthermore, Horace seems 
to have implicated the Epistles as a whole in this pretence; they are 
poems written to a patron’s demand but ‘pose’ as his personal letters. 
I argue that Horace created this poetic dynamic, the liar persona in 
his false letters, in order to ‘unmask’ himself and disclose his real 
view of the nature of his relationship with Maecenas. 
I 
Book 1 of the Epistles consists of 20 poems in the guise of letters in which Horace 
professes a desire to abandon his public role to recover his spiritual, physical and 
moral health and, most importantly, his freedom. The Epistles were written after 
the publication of Sermones (1, 2) and Odes (1-3), most likely in 20 or 19 BC, by 
which time Horace had been amicus of Maecenas for some fifteen years and in 
possession of his famous Sabine farm for about ten.1 Epistles 1 are often seen as 
related to Sermones in that they both use the same metre (dactylic hexameter) to 
present similar personal, social and philosophical concerns while differing in the 
way they handle the sensitive issue of the nature of Horace’s relationship with his 
patron Maecenas. In Epistles 1, Horace expresses his yearning to restore himself to 
freedom, to loosen the ties of patronage that bind him to his patron, but in striking 
such a pose Horace demolishes the credibility of the self-portrayal in his earlier 
poetry, most notably in the Sermones. The ‘Horace’ of Sermones insisted that his 
relationship with his patrons was ‘free’ and ‘true’ amicitia, a close egalitarian 
friendship, based on sentiment and moral equality rather than on gifts and favours.2 
                                                     
1
  See e.g. Bowditch 2001:162. 
2
  Horace refers to himself and those he celebrates as amici (‘friends’), implying that  
his relationship with these men was based primarily on sentiment, Od. 2.6.24, 3.8.13; 
Serm. 1.6, 1.9, 1.10.85-7; Epist.1.9.5. Konstan 1995:329 observed that ‘Amicus … 
means only “friend” and does not mean client at all’. See also Williams 1994:395;  
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On the other hand, in the opening lines of Epistle 1, Horace addresses Maecenas 
and refers to his clientage by utilising a metaphor drawn from the career of a slave, 
a gladiator (1.1-4)3: 
 
Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena, 
spectatum satis et donatum iam rude quaeris, 
Maecenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo? 
non eadem est aetas, non mens. 
 
You of whom my earliest Muse has told, of whom my last shall tell, 
you Maecenas, seek to shut me up again in my old gladiatorial 
school, though well tested in the fray, and already presented with the 
wooden sword. 
 
The gladiator: ‘crude, loathsome, doomed, lost (importunus, obscaenus, damnatus, 
perditus), was throughout Roman tradition a man utterly debased by fortune, a 
slave, a man altogether without worth and dignity (dignitas), almost without 
humanity’.4 By utilising such an image, Horace clearly casts his relationship with 
Maecenas in an entirely different mould from that found in Sermones. By claiming 
to have sufficiently compensated his master, having earned his ‘wooden sword’ 
(rude) ― the sign of a job well done and the guarantor of freedom ― Horace 
‘exposes’ his relationship with Maecenas as one of the most despised, a 
relationship based on utilitas rather than on virtus.5 Immediately below, in line 8, 
Horace reinforces the image of the gladiator with that of an overworked animal and 
compares himself to an old horse (senescentem … equum, 8). In the lines that 
follow, the metaphor continues, albeit in somewhat modified form: Horace alludes 
to a cheated lover, a boy under the care of his mother, and a labourer (20-23). All 
of them are dependants, subject to others, and slavery still looms large. The 
cheated lover recalls the theme of the ‘slavery to love’ (servitium amoris) often 
encountered in the elegists of the Augustan period,6 and several sources speak of 
                                                                                                                          
White 2007:195-206. For the view that amicitia was straddling both the world of 
friendship and the social and economic ‘network’ relationship, see Saller 1982; 
Verboven 2001.  
3
  The English translations of Epistles are taken from Fairclough 1966. 
4
  Barton 1993:1. 
5
  This metaphor became popular with later poets, among others, Ov. Tr. 4.8.24. 
6
  As a number of scholars have observed, the language of the servitium amoris (slavery of 
love) featured by the elegists of the Augustan period overlaps with the language of 
patronage, Fitzgerald 2000:72; White 1993:87-91. 
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the labourer’s existence as slavish, in that the labourer is merely a tool in someone 
else’s hands.7 
Of course, the problems of gauging Horace’s tone and the levels of irony in 
the Epistles are numerous and the text itself rarely provides reliable clues on which 
to base our decisions regarding which of Horace’s personae to trust, if any, and 
when. Such decisions are usually based on preconceived notions of Horace and his 
position in society. For example, earlier generations of critics considered Horace’s 
self-portrayal in Sermones as quite trustworthy and therefore as sufficient proof 
that the historical Horace maintained his freedom in the face of power. 8  Thus these 
critics were more likely to regard the ‘admission’ of Epistles as an ironic metaphor.  
Nowadays, scholars are more likely to question Sermones’ persona’s claims and 
assert that the Horace of Sermones is a product of the author’s ‘image 
management’ program. Lyne, for example, argued that in Sermones Horace was 
protecting his public image in order to prevent his audience from developing the 
‘wrong’ perception of him. He was dealing, Lyne argues, with his ‘personal 
embarrassments’: one arising from the fact that he had come to endorse the regime 
that defeated the Republican cause he himself had fought for in 42 BC, and another 
from the potential suggestion that he had become a turncoat in return for money 
and gifts.9  As he was open to the charge of being Maecenas’s parasitic hanger-on 
(scurra), Horace chose to cloak his dependency in images of friendly camaraderie 
and thus constructed an alternative and more attractive version of himself in his 
poetry.10 To DuQuesnay such image management was calculated to soothe the fears 
of Horace’s contemporaries in regards to the character and intentions of Maecenas 
and Octavian,11 while McNeill notices that such self-representation would have 
created the impression that Horace endorsed the regime freely and independently 
                                                     
7
  For example, Heraclides Ponticus stated, ‘Enjoyment and good living are reserved for 
free men, for this exalts and enhances the spirit. Labouring, on the other hand, is for 
slaves, and that is why their character deteriorates’, Athen. 12, 512a. According to 
Aristotle, one should not work for another lest he enslaves himself by becoming a tool in 
someone else’s hands: ‘it is the condition of a free man not to live for the benefit of 
others’, Rhet. 1367a 32-33; Vogt 1974:13. 
8
  For a good overview of the biographical tradition of criticism of Horace, see Harrison 
1995:4-6. 
9
  Lyne 1995:13-20. 
10
   Some of Horace’s contemporaries have thought it perfectly fitting to interpret his 
relationship with Maecenas in everyday terms of a dependent client doing the bidding of 
his master, Serm. 1.6.45-48. See also Damon 1997:17, 24, 127.  
11
  As DuQuesnay 1984:34, 31, 57 observes: ‘The image of Maecenas’s friends which 
emerges from the poems is … so exactly calculated to allay the fears and anxieties of 
Horace’s contemporaries about the intentions, ambitions, and moral character of their 
new leaders, that is just not possible to suppose that the effect is accidental’. 
56  MARIC 
 
and thus bestowed on his poetry a propaganda value it would otherwise not have 
had.12   
If this is indeed so, the question we have to ask is why Horace would 
jeopardise this whole ideological project in Epistles and openly suggest that his 
existence as Maecenas’s client was paramount to slavery. We are certainly still at 
liberty to regard this whole ‘admission’ as a humorously extreme depiction of 
Roman patronal relations, but below I will opt for a more literal reading, primarily 
because of an extremely interesting poetic dynamic Horace created in Epistles.  
I have dubbed Epistles as ‘poetry of dissimulatio’ for two reasons: firstly, because I 
believe that Horace constructed their main speaker as a duplicitous ‘liar persona’,  
a dissimulating slave to which we may also refer to as ‘Davus’s Horace’. Several 
years ago, Johnson noticed that in the opening lines of Epistles 1 Horace in fact 
concedes fully and irrevocably the famous accusation levelled at him in the second 
book of Sermones by his slave Davus.13 The poem in which this accusation appears 
(Sat. 2.7) is set in Rome during the Saturnalia, when it was customary to allow 
slaves to speak their minds freely, and Horace’s slave Davus uses the occasion to 
charge Horace with the vice of inconsistency.14 As the poem progresses, it becomes 
clear that in Davus’s eyes this inconsistency is a symptom of Horace’s underlying 
moral slavery, which Davus also regards as the cause of Horace’s literal 
enslavement to his patron Maecenas. If not invited out by Maecenas, Davus claims, 
Horace poses as a self-sufficient sage praising his frugal meal, but once he receives 
an invitation, he runs to Maecenas like he is being chased (2.7.23-45). What this 
shows, Davus claims, is that Horace is a slave who, as it happens, owns one too 
(79-80): ‘Why you who lord it over me, are the wretched slave of another master, 
and you are moved like a wooden puppet by wires that others pull. Who then is 
                                                     
12
  McNeill 2001:6, 92-110 argues that Horace’s endorsement of the Augustan regime in 
his seemingly un-political Sermones constitutes ‘true’ sociological propaganda, or that 
which Jacques Ellul 1965:4 has termed the ‘propaganda of integration’. McNeill 
suggested that Horace delivered the ideological message of his masters as personal 
views on moral and social issues and, at the same time created a note of apparent 
personal distance, diverging occasionally from the party line as a way of delineating for 
himself a self-image as an ‘independent commentator’ on Augustus and his regime.  
See also Foulkes 1983:107. 
13
  Johnson 1993:5 observes that in Epistles 1, the Horatian personae say the same things 
Davus had said, ‘more calmly and less savagely but as relentlessly and at times as 
incisively as Davus had said them’.   
14
  Consistency was a virtue commonly discussed in Stoic texts and it involved an 
unwavering commitment to one’s professed moral principles, knowing who you were 
and staying that regardless of any dangers or temptations. This Stoic virtue preoccupied 
Horace quite a bit and the Epistles are permeated with passages dealing with this theme. 
See McGann 1969:13; Oliensis 1998:6; Rudd 1966:138. 
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free?’15 A few lines earlier, Davus compared Horace to the parasite Mulvius, but 
said that Mulvius is a better man because he is honest about what and who he is 
(37-43): 
 
 ‘Etenim fateor me’, dixerit ille, 
‘duci ventre levem, nasum nidore supinor. 
imbecillus, iners, si quid vis, adde popino. 
tu cum sis quod ego et fortassis nequior, ultro 
insectere velut melior verbisque decoris 
obvolvas vitium?’ ‘quid, si me stultior ipso 
 quingentis empto drachmis deprenderis’? 
 
‘Yes’, he (Mulvius) would say, ‘’tis true that I’m a fickle creature, 
led by my stomach. I curl up my nose for a savoury smell. I’m weak, 
lazy and if you like to add, a toper. But you since you are just the 
same and maybe worse, would you presume to assail me, as though 
you were better man, and would you throw over your own vices a 
cloak of seemly words?’... ‘What if you are found to be a greater fool 
than even I, who cost you five hundred drachmas?’  
Davus, therefore, explicitly attacks Horace’s ‘free amicus’ persona, suggesting that 
this persona is nothing more than a cloak of ‘seemly words’ (verbis … decoris, 
2.7.41), an external mask covering the parasite beneath. It is this dishonesty, 
perhaps his self-deceit, which makes Horace, in Davus’s eyes, ‘a slave many times 
over’ (totiens servus, 2.7.70).16 At this point, Horace’s persona does not conceal its 
unease with Davus’s words, resorting to a threat of force (116-121), but in Epistles, 
as we saw, we witness a striking change of tone as Horace’s persona recalls and 
openly admits every single aspect of Davus’s accusation.  
I do not argue that the admission of Epistle 1 makes Horace’s epistolary 
persona into ‘Davus’s Horace’, but rather that its continued deception does so. 
Horace’s ‘liar persona’ is ‘honest’ in that it concedes Davus’s point and admits to 
its enslaved past, but nevertheless deceptive in that it falsely claims a clear break 
                                                     
15
  Nempe tu, mihi qui imperitas, alii servis miser atque duceris ut nervis alienis mobile 
lignum. Quisnam igitur liber? 
16
  When parasites feature in the ancient plays, the parallels between them (ostensibly free 
men) and slaves (legally bound) are evident to the audience but not to the parasites, who 
even boast of their position. See Damon 1997:33; Bernstein 1987:37-61, 50-51. On the 
other hand, such an accusation may be unfair given that Horace admitted to some of his 
‘crimes’ in earlier satires, thus pre-empting much of the blame Davus tries to attach to 
him. For other ways in which Davus’ arguments are weakened, see Sharland 2010:261-
316, 289-292. 
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from it. Horace, I will argue, allows us to see this deception; on the surface, he asks 
his readership to accept his persona’s overt claims that there is a clear break 
between his present freedom and past slavery, but he employs various strategies in 
order to ultimately ‘expose’ these claims as that which Davus labelled ‘seemly 
words’.  
Although I will not read Epistles as straight autobiographical documents but 
will instead examine Horace’s manipulation of his various personae, his poetic 
‘deceptions’ and ways of obscuring the line between the real and the fictitious in 
life and literature, I will argue that Epistles are indeed concerned with the truth of 
the matter. I hold that Horace’s ‘exposing’ of his persona’s deceptions does in fact 
represent his disclosure of his real view on the nature of his relationship with his 
patron rather than, for example, a poetic problematicising of the issue, a stimulus 
for (misguided?) attempts to reach the man behind the poetic personae. I am well 
aware, of course, that the Horace of Epistles might be stripping away one mask 
only to present us with another, that in poetry the author’s dissimulatio, in one 
form or another, never really ends, but I have opted against such a view due to two 
curious and unique features of Epistles. 
The first feature is also the second reason for my labelling the Epistles as 
poetry of dissimulatio, namely, my belief that Horace made this whole genre 
complicit in his persona’s pretence. The Epistles are poems posing as letters and 
this pose I believe, is an inseparable part of its main persona’s dissimulatio. In the 
final poem, Epistle 20, Horace casts the whole of Book 1 in the figure of a slave 
and thus, I will argue, ends the dissimulatio of both the book and its main persona, 
the two entities he separates in this poem.17 The reason Horace separated his 
epistolary persona from the book of poetry has to do, I will argue, with Horace’s 
intention to allow the reader insights into the man behind the poetic persona. He 
portrays Book 1 and its persona as separate entities in order to remind us of a 
simple truth: the historical author can always disassociate himself from his poetic 
persona but he can never disassociate himself from his poetry. The poetry will 
always be traced back to him. The second reason for my identifying the ‘liar 
persona’ with the historical author is the all-encompassing nature of this persona. 
Unlike any other, this persona transcends the genre it originally appeared in and 
affects all of Horace’s poetic personae, past, present and future. It claims that 
Horace’s past personae are the masks of a dissimulator while exposing itself as 
such, and then it projects its claims into the future by announcing the continuation 
of Horace’s poetic career in unaltered terms. This persona, I will argue, is the only 
one Horace could never shed once he assumed it.  
                                                     
17
  On the literary precedents of this poem, see Kiessling & Heinze 1959:190. 
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II 
Whilst the autobiographical slant of Horace’s works in general tends to direct his 
gaze inwards, this appears to be particularly true of Epistles. In Epistles 1, Horace 
expresses to Maecenas his desire to search for the ‘true’ and ‘appropriate’: ‘So now 
I lay my verses down, and all my other games, to study what is true and 
appropriate, totally involved in that’ (nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono / 
quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum, 10-12). Decens is 
recognised to be Horace’s rendering of Panaetius’s decorum, which signified an 
‘an outer face of virtue’, a consistent performance of one’s primary role as a 
human being, in accordance with one’s rational human nature, one’s individual 
nature, circumstances, station in life and so on.18 The achievement of decorum 
depended on intense self-scrutiny and self-knowledge and an epistle appears to be 
a well-chosen medium for such a project.19 Until relatively recently, critics have 
focused their attention on the issue of whether or not the Epistles were real letters: 
older commentators would regard the Epistles as personal communication between 
Horace and his addressees, while in recent years, scholars generally accept their 
fictional and poetic nature.20 Nevertheless, part of the answer as to why Horace 
chose to cast his poetry in the form of letters, as Mayer has observed, had to do 
with his professed intention to pursue a program of self-revelation.21 The ancients 
regarded the letter as normal speech in a written medium and would often define it 
as one half of a dialogue, or a surrogate to actual dialogue,22 as well as recognise it 
as a particularly personal form, as an ‘ego document’ that expresses the character 
and personality of its writer particularly clearly.23 By announcing his project of 
                                                     
18
  The term decens, as McGann 1969:41 has observed, can at this time only point to the 
ethics of Panaetius and to what Cicero chose to render as decorum. For decorum in 
Cicero see Off. 1.13-14, 94-98, 107, 110-111, 113-114; 120; 125; Mitchell 1991:35; De 
Lacy 1977:165; Gill 1988:191-192. 
19
  In Cicero and Panaetius, the achievement of decorum is very much connected with self-
knowledge; they thought that men should know themselves and act in accordance with 
that knowledge, using their own nature as a yardstick by which to judge the 
appropriateness of a contemplated pursuit. For epistolary self-search, see Edwards 
1997:24; Mayer 1994:2; Stowers 1986:39.  
20
  For a summary of views, see Mayer 1994:3; Bowditch 2001:164. 
21
  ‘Clearly Horace did not feel that he had yet done with himself as a theme and the letter 
offered a fresh form in which to pursue the program of self-revelation’, Mayer 1994:4. 
22
  Dem. Eloc. 223; Cic. Fam. 2.4.1, 12.30.1; Att. 8, 14.1, 9; Sen. Epist. 75; Lib. 2.58. 
23
  Dem. Eloc. 227: ‘The letter, like the dialogue, should abound in glimpses of character. It 
may be said that everybody reveals his own soul in his letters. In every other form of 
composition it is possible to discern the writer’s character, but none so clearly as in the 
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self-discovery in the first epistle, therefore, which the reader will supposedly be 
able to trace in the collection of ‘letters’ that follow, Horace explicitly and 
implicitly ‘promises’ that he will end all the intentional and unintentional 
deceptions that might have characterised him in the past and provide us instead 
with an accurate picture of himself as he truly is.24  
The opening lines of Epistle 1, which ‘expose’ the falsity of Horace’s 
earlier self-portrayal indeed indicate his serious intent to deliver on this promise, 
but immediately after we are confronted with a claim which threatens to destroy 
the credibility of Horace’s epistolary persona. When Horace writes in a well-
crafted hexameter, ‘So now I lay my verses down, and all my other games, to study 
what is true and appropriate,’ he is in danger of exposing the fictitious nature of 
this whole project. Some commentators assert that Horace only wishes to say that 
he is changing genre from the more poetic Odes to the more earnest philosophical 
form of the Epistles, as this would be consistent with the contrast already seen  
in the Sermones between sermo and ‘real’ poetry (Serm. 1.4.39-44, 2.6.17). 
Nevertheless, given that Horace frequently uses versus in Sermones to designate 
satire,25 the claim that he is abandoning versus (Epistles 1.10) should be taken to 
mean all poetry.26 Others have opted for saying that the entire Book 1 of Epistles is 
‘the longest and most involved recusatio that the poet ever addressed to 
Maecenas’.27 Such ‘refusals’ to write were frequent in Augustan poetry but, as 
forms of recusationes, the Epistles are unusual in that they ground their refusal by 
referring to a past debt made good, rather than by claiming inadequacy to the task, 
as is typical with this type of poetry.28  
Ultimately, the Epistles are some form of recusatio: despite his apparent 
refusal to write, Horace was in fact writing and did publish a book of poetry 
dedicated to Maecenas. In order to understand exactly what form, we would do 
well to remember that Horace presents his ‘refusal’ as the first and most crucial 
step in his quest to restore himself to freedom, to distance himself from his 
‘enslaved’ past. By exposing the insincerity of this refusal, therefore, Horace puts 
                                                                                                                          
epistolary’. Cic. Fam. 16.16.2, ‘ … you sent me the news in precisely the proper way. 
All of you was revealed to me in your letter’ (Te totum in litteris vidi); Stowers 1986:39. 
24
  Even while accepting that the Epistles were not real letters, some scholars tend to regard 
them as valuable historical documents because they ‘scrutinise the pleasures, pains and 
problems of living against a standard represented by philosophy, and because the 
author’s experience, more than anyone else’s, undergoes that examination’, Macleod 
1979:27. 
25
  Hor. Serm. 1.4.8, 1.10.1, 40-49, 61, 70; McGann 1969:35. 
26
  See McGann 1969:35; Harrison 1995:51. 
27
  Traina in Freudenburg 2002:125; Oliensis 1998:155. 
28
  Bowditch 2001:162. 
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in doubt this very distance: if writing poetry to order was slavery before, it is 
slavery still. We are led to suspect, therefore, that the man writing is the same slave 
he always was. Seen from this angle, then, this unusual form of epistolary 
recusatio starts to appear as a rather typical dissimulatio and Horace’s epistolary 
‘free’ persona is once again in danger of being exposed as a sum of ‘seemly 
words’. Furthermore, Horace’s ‘refusal’ in Epistles 1 is not only verbal but taken to 
the next level in that the poetry he writes is ‘masked’ by the consistent 
maintenance and repeated assertion of the framework of an epistolary exchange.29 
The author maintains the pretence of writing letters and thus makes this whole 
genre complicit in his persona’s dissimulatio. However transparent, the epistolary 
surface of these poems provides Horace’s ‘refusal’ with some degree of credibility; 
it ‘hides’ the poetry and with it, I would argue, the slave writing it.  
Epistle 20 confirms this suspicion as Horace casts the now complete volume 
of Epistles in the figure of a pretty slave raised in his household but anxious to run 
away and publish itself. A more detailed treatment of Epistle 20 is best left for 
later, but at this point, we have to acknowledge the need to read Book 1 in light of 
this poem’s revelation. Provided that the Epistles are read in order, Epistle 20 
would reveal to the reader that the book he / she has just finished reading is in 
some sense a slave and would thus invite a second reading in light of this 
knowledge. When Horace says the book is a slave, he also designates its primary 
voice as such; although he maintains the transparent fiction that his persona is a 
separate entity from his book, it is clear that by depriving his poetry of a human 
persona, he also deprives his poetic self of the same. Epistle 20 asks the readers  
to go back and read with an awareness that the primary voice of Epistles is a slave 
and thus to be weary of anything that might suggest otherwise, as that is more  
than likely a slave’s dissimulatio. Horace does not rely solely on Epistle 20 to 
justify such a reading since, as I already mentioned, throughout the Epistles he 
continuously undermines the credibility of his epistolary persona by other devices. 
By the time we arrive at Epistle 20, we hardly even need its revelation to inform us 
that in the previous nineteen poems we have been addressed by a dissimulating 
slave.  
We will leave the issue of the slavery of Horace’s persona aside for a 
moment, and concentrate on that which testifies to its present freedom. In lines 37-
                                                     
29
  As well as deploying standard formulae of salutation at beginning and end of the letters 
(eg. 1.8.1, 6.67, 10.1), Horace alludes to prior exchange with his correspondents through 
answers, requests or complaints (1.12). He also appears to expect answers or visits, and 
gives and seeks information (1.30, 5.30, 10.49, 15.25). The pretence of a real letter is 
further kept up by imitating the miscellaneous character of real correspondence, or by 
jumbling together unrelated topics, see Ferri 2007:122-123; Allen 1970:255-266; Allen 
1972:119-133; De Pretis 2004. 
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42 of the first epistle, Horace states explicitly that the life of philosophical 
seclusion he has now chosen will liberate him morally and indeed humanise him, 
as it would humanise the worst of moral slaves or tame the fiercest of wild beasts: 
 
Invidus, iracundus, iners, vinosus, amator, 
nemo adeo ferus est, ut non mitescere possit 
si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem. 
Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima 
stultitia caruisse. 
 
The slave to envy, anger, sloth, wine, lewdness ― no one is so 
savage a beast that he cannot be tamed, if only he lend to treatment a 
patient ear. To flee vice is the beginning of virtue, and to have got rid 
of folly is the beginning of wisdom.  
Here we see Horace taking a first step towards decorum, recovering his ‘humanity’ 
by choosing a life of moral contemplation, far removed from the vices of the city.30  
By turning in lines 76-93 to the theme of inconsistency, Horace indicates to 
Maecenas that in Rome and close to him he stands little chance of moral recovery. 
Inconsistency, we might remember, was the failure singled out by Davus as the 
chief symptom of Horace’s moral slavery.31 In Panaetius and Cicero, the 
achievement of life-long consistency (constantia) was central to decorum and 
Horace professes to aim for it, explicitly stating to Maecenas why he cannot 
achieve it in Rome (Epistles 1.101-105):  
 
Insanire putas sollemnia me neque rides, 
nec medici credis nec curatoris egere 
a praetore dati, rerum tutela mearum 
cum sis et prave sectum stomacheris ob unguem 
de te pendentis, te respicientis amici. 
                                                     
30
  The first general type of decorum, Cicero writes, found in moral goodness and is defined 
as that ‘which harmonises with man’s superiority in those respects in which his nature 
differs from the rest of animal creation’ (quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in 
eo in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat, Off. 1.96).   
31
  In Epistles, Horace becomes quite preoccupied with this particular failure and admits 
being once guilty of it which, from a Stoic point of view, was the first step towards 
moral health. The refusal to recognise one’s situation clearly, Stoics insisted, is 
guarantee that one will remain forever a moral slave and continue to live a life of 
random inconsistency, see Bernstein 1987:54. The Epistles are permeated with passages 
dealing explicitly with this theme; see McGann 1969:13; Oliensis 1998:166; La Penna 
1993:180-181. As Rudd 1966:138 has observed, ‘consistency, which in morals involves 
the integration of the personality … held a special interest for Horace’. 
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You think my madness is the usual thing, and neither laugh at me nor 
deem that I need a physician or a guardian assigned by the court, 
though you are keeper of my fortunes, and flare up at an ill pared 
nail of the friend who hangs upon you and looks to you in all. 
These lines are a stark contrast to Sermones where Maecenas was portrayed as 
being primarily interested in Horace’s moral virtues, which, Horace claimed, was 
the chief foundation of their friendship.32 Here, on the other hand, we are asked to 
believe that Maecenas tolerates Horace’s vices and that he sees and only cares 
about his deceptive externals. Furthermore, in Sermones, Horace described 
Maecenas’s home as a place of highest moral standards, as a place which is 
morally ‘pure’ (purus) and suitable for a man of his own moral purity (Sat. 1. 
9.49).33 In the passage above, Maecenas’s home is a place where immorality is 
normalised and acceptable, and this forces Horace to leave it behind and instead 
seek moral health and sanity elsewhere, namely, in the country at his Sabine farm.  
 The Sabine farm allows Horace a self-renewal of sorts, it ‘restores him to 
himself’ (mihi me reddentis agelli, Epist.1.14.1). Epistle 16 sketches a picture of 
the Sabine farm particularly well; it is a refuge for the nourishment of body and 
soul (1.16.1-16), a place that sufficiently provides for all of Horace’s needs. These 
needs are modest; he is satisfied with a frugal meal and a nap by the stream 
(1.14.31-36), the simple pleasures which in Epistle 5 he wishes to share with his 
friend Torquatus (1-4).34 In Epistle 7, Horace stakes his claim to freedom in 
particularly strong terms. He expresses to Maecenas his readiness to give him back 
all his gifts should he start to feel that these are undermining his efforts. In the 
opening lines, Horace defies Maecenas’s wish that he return to Rome (1-13) and 
then goes on to explore the relationship between beneficia and amicitia through a 
                                                     
32
  In Satire 6, for example, Maecenas is described as caring little for the prejudices of the 
masses who would deny friendship to Horace on account of his servile birth. Maecenas, 
Horace states, required only that those men who were to be admitted to his friendship be 
of free birth (cum referre negas quali sit quisque parente / natus, dum ingenuus, 1-8) 
and of right character. In lines 62-71 Maecenas’s primary concern is with Horace’s 
moral virtues and on the basis of these, he decides to admit Horace into his circle. See 
Schlegel 2000:93-119. 
33
  ‘Through the word purus’, as Welch 2001:171 observes ‘Maecenas’s house itself 
becomes a physical locus for the sort of moral excellence Horace acquired from his stern 
father’. 
34
  In Epistle 10, Horace addresses Fuscus, a lover of city life, and repeats the association of 
his past life with slavery. He describes his own preference for the country, comparing 
himself to a temple slave who freed himself, fleeing from a diet of rich food (liba, 
mellitae placentae) to plain bread, a taste of which now guides his attitudes towards 
worldly things (11-12). 
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series of exemplary tales dealing with a gift’s potential to enslave the recipient.  
It is sufficient to mention only the first of these stories, the famous tale about a 
little fox (or shrew mouse) that enters a bin of grain. Having eaten too much of the 
grain, this fox gets so fat that it is imprisoned by the size of its belly and cannot get 
out. Horace is aware that this image may potentially apply to him and thus asserts 
to Maecenas: ‘If challenged by this fable, I give up all … try me, whether I can 
restore your gifts and cheerfully too’ (hac ego si compellor imagine, cuncta 
resigno … inspice si possum donata reponere laetus, 34, 39).35 
 While we hardly need a stronger statement of Horace’s determination to 
emancipate himself from his dependency of Maecenas, it does not take long to 
suspect that something is not quite right with this picture, that our speaker is not all 
he seems.36 The first clue comes from the fact that in Epistles Horace utilised the 
language of the fable. It is well known that Horace often narrated or alluded to 
fables in his Sermones and Epistles to convey a moral lesson. It is also widely 
recognised that this genre was considered to have been invented by slaves: the 
fabulist and freedman Phaedrus explained the fables of Aesopus (also a freedman) 
as being the means by which slaves expressed their point of view under conditions 
of social, political and legal disenfranchisement and oppression.37 In her recent 
discussion, Ilaria Marchesi has analysed the role of the fable in satire and argues 
that the fable performs the role of a ‘freed genre’ in that it ‘situates itself in the 
same ambiguous cultural space defined by the intersection of freedom and 
servitude in which Roman society located the freedmen’.38 Because fables were, so 
to speak, the slave’s language, to claim independence from one’s servile past 
through the language of the fable is, Marchesi argues, to preserve the traces of that 
very past.39  
Marchesi has observed Horace’s usage of the language of the fable in both 
Sermones and Epistles, and she notices a striking difference. In Sermones, the 
literary redeployment of this genre is consistently associated with the direct 
presence or indirect evocation of slaves. Horace uses fable as a way of 
                                                     
35
  See Drexler 1963:26-37. 
36
  Several scholars have noticed that Horace’s apparent determination to restore Maecenas’ 
gifts is somewhat unconvincing, for example, Oliensis 1998:161; Drexler 1963:33.  
37
  ‘Now, why the genre of the fable was discovered. Briefly, I’ll explain. Always liable to 
harm, the slave, not daring to speak outright what he wished, translated his own 
affections into fables and so eluded censure with made up jestings’, Phaed. Book 3 
(prologue); Reiss 2003:181. As Fitzgerald 2000:100 observes: ‘Slaves appropriated the 
animal status assigned to them by the official culture of their masters as a position from 
which to voice their own perspective’.  
38
  Marchesi 2005:308. 
39
  Marchesi 2005:308. 
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acknowledging his father’s servile origin as well as to ensure his own 
disassociation from this status by distancing his persona from this language or by 
counterbalancing its servile undertones.40 On the other hand, in Epistles Horace’s 
persona takes full responsibility for utilising the language of fable and Horace 
employs no distancing strategies, treating it instead in an increasingly unmediated 
fashion.41 Marchesi interprets this as a sign of Horace’s growing confidence, of the 
personal stigma associated with his father’s slavery receding deeper into the past,42 
but I believe we would do well to follow Marchesi’s argument to its logical 
conclusion. In my opinion, the language of fable serves here the function which 
Marchesi identified as its typical one, to recall the servile past it seeks to repress, 
and Horace uses it in order to undermine the overt claims to freedom of his 
epistolary persona, to hint that we are being addressed by a dissimulating slave.43  
Another reason for thinking that we are witnessing here the slave’s 
dissimulatio is the inconsistency of Horace’s epistolary persona. In some poems, 
as in those observed above, Horace is a man dedicated to seclusion and 
philosophical improvement, but in others, he is more of a hedonistic debauchee 
anxious to resume his poetic career. For example, whilst in Epistle 14 Horace is 
longing to leave Rome for his farm, chiding his bailiff’s lust for wine, women and 
song, in Epistle 15 he is contemplating an excursion to the seaside, anticipating the 
company of women, rejuvenation and the reconstruction of his lyric persona with 
the help of a bottle of wine (19-21).44 We could certainly regard this as Horace’s 
play with the endless possibilities of literary self-presentation but, in light of the 
project he supposedly embarked on in Epistle 1, we should probably view these 
                                                     
40
  For example, Marchesi 2005:311 observes that in Satire 6, (22) Horace alludes to the 
famous fable of the ass who dons a lion’s skin as a way of acknowledging his father’s 
servile origins but this autobiographical association with a servile family past is couched 
in an argument about Maecenas’s ability to distinguish personal talent from familial 
background. Accordingly, the mention of a servile family history is then at the same 
time the point in which Horace most clearly and most strongly disassociates his persona 
from that past: ‘Thanks to Maecenas the poet’s familial past does not extend into his 
present and no father-son continuity is allowed to be constructed at this point’. 
41
  Marchesi 2005:322. 
42
  Marchesi 2005:322.  
43
  In Epistle 1.7, where Horace is most assertive in his declaration of independence, there 
are also the most reasons to suspect him. Bowditch has convincingly argued for viewing 
the persona of 1.7 as a ‘duplicitous speaker’, a designation fitting from the very 
beginning of the poem where Horace calls himself ‘liar’ (mendax, 2), ‘as if  to 
underscore the potential for deceit possessed by any representation of the self in 
language’,  Bowditch 2001:182. Frankel 1957:336 also notices that Epistle 1.7 is also 
the poem in which Horace narrates the most fables. 
44
  ‘ … the kind that will supply me with a stock of words and recommend me, a young 
man again, to a Lucanian girlfriend’, Epist. 1.15.20-21; Oliensis 1998:166. 
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inconsistencies as a portrayal of Horace’s stumbling on his path towards decorum.45 
In Epistle 15, Horace openly admits to being guilty of such behaviour, saying that, 
when his means are modest, he is content with little, but should this change he 
easily praises and aspires to the life of the rich, thinking that only they live well 
(bene vivere, 45, 42-46).  
This admission immediately follows the description of the scurra Maenius, 
a typical moral slave who labours just to satisfy his insatiable belly in which, 
Horace writes, he could fit the contents of an entire marketplace (Epistle 1.15.26-
35). Prior to supporting the claim by narrating his inconsistent behaviour, Horace 
adopts Maenius as an emblem of himself: ‘Such a man in truth am I’ (nimirum hic 
ego sum, 42).46 Such an admission might be interpreted in less than serious terms, 
as a pleasant little piece of poetic self-deprecation, but we should notice how this 
claim undermines Horace’s display of determination in Epistle 1.7 not to allow the 
image of the big-bellied fox to apply to him and his resultant readiness to return to 
Maecenas all of his gifts. The big-bellied animal Horace identifies with here is of a 
different species but the connection is clear.47  In any case, we are starting to see 
here glimpses of Davus’s Horace in that Horace’s persona displays precisely the 
type of behaviour Davus considered as symptomatic of moral slavery. Horace has 
already admitted that this behaviour has characterised him in the past, but the fact 
                                                     
45
  It is exactly this is sort of behaviour that Panaetius and Cicero singled out as inimical to 
consistency, see Off. 1.111. In any case, it is precisely when it comes to the vice of 
inconsistency that life and theatre merge in ancient texts. The theatrical metaphor was 
regarded as the most suitable for representing failures in constantia. Most famously, 
Seneca stated in Epistle 120 that, ‘This is above all the sign of a foolish mind; it appears 
first in one form and then in another and, which I judge worst of all, it is never like 
itself. Believe me, it is a great thing to play the role of one man. But nobody can act the 
part of a single person except the wise man: the rest of us slip from one character 
(persona) to another’, 120.122.  
46
  Horace goes even further in describing the extent of his dependence when he defends 
himself against the charge of ingratitude to Maecenas, saying  ‘You’ve often praised my 
unassuming self, and I’ve called you “king” (rex) and “father”’ (rexque paterque, Epist. 
1.7.37).  Here Horace is donning the mask of the parasite since ‘king’ (rex) is a common 
term used by comic parasites to flatter their patrons, like in Plautus’s Asin. 919; Damon 
1997:112-125. 
47
  The Scurra was often equated with an animal in that he was regarded as a morally 
bankrupt individual who had lost all the attributes of humanity due to his enslavement to 
his lower appetites. For example, Plutarch says of scurra that, ‘The belly is all there is to 
his body. It’s an eye that looks high and low, a beast that creeps along on its teeth’, Mor. 
54B; Damon 1997:32. It is this enslavement that led the scurra to flatter the powerful, 
and this behaviour acts as a further indicator of his subhuman nature or, as Demetrius 
put it, ‘A man who flatters the fortunate and … considers only means of gain, should 
surely be hated as an enemy of all human nature’, Dem. 14.65. 
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that he admits it now, while on his Sabine farm which supposedly allowed him a 
life free from such vices, obliterates once again any distance between his enslaved 
past and his supposed ‘free’ present.  
The temptation in scholarship to regard these and similar images as 
examples of Horatian irony arises from an often displayed confidence that Horace 
was a type of client quite distinct from the sycophantic ‘yes-men’ he often 
caricatures. There are certainly some grounds for the belief that the ancients 
maintained a clear distinction between the honourable client and the self-serving 
parasite, and Horace has something to say on this issue in Epistles 17 and 18. 
These are paired poems in which Horace offers instruction in the art of winning 
and keeping a patron to two young men who are about to embark on their clientary 
careers. The subject of Epistle 1.17 purports to be ‘the right way to keep company 
with men more important than oneself’ (quo … pacto deceat maioribus uti,  
Epist. 2). At lines 13-22, Horace stages a debate between the philosopher 
Aristippus who associated with the rich and reaped the benefits of doing so, and an 
uncompromising Diogenes to whom such behaviour was a sign of moral slavery. 
In lines 13-14, Diogenes alludes to Aristippus’s supposed gluttony by saying:  
‘If Aristippus could learn to dine on turnip greens, he wouldn’t mess around with 
princes’ (si pranderet holus patienter, regibus uti / nollet Aristippus). Aristippus 
counters this claim by crediting Diogenes’s supposed lack of social graces for his 
reluctance to associate with the rich: ‘If he who rebukes me knew how to mingle 
with princes, he would come to despise his dreadful vegetables’ (si sciret regibus 
uti  / fastidiret holus qui me notat, 14-15).  
At line 17, Horace states his approval of Aristippus’s ways: Diogenes posed 
as a self-sufficient sage but nevertheless depended on handouts, while Aristippus 
openly pursued benefits for his services. ‘I play the scurra for my own benefit’, 
Aristippus says, ‘to have a horse to carry me and a patron to feed me’ (scurror ipse 
mihi … equus ut me portet, alat rex, 19-20). Aristippus’s strength, Horace writes, 
was in adapting himself to every circumstance while remaining content whether he 
had a little or a lot (23-26). Scholars often observe that Aristippus’s friendship with 
the elite validated Horace’s own way of life; he appealed to Horace first and 
foremost because “he was capable of adapting himself to the situation, occasion 
and role, appropriately performing his part in every circumstance”.48 Aristippus’s 
adaptability was not regarded as undignified, so it is thought that in emulating his 
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  D. L. 2.66. Adaptability, as long as it was becoming, has been encouraged in popular 
morality and was also accorded philosophical respectability by Marcus Aurelius and 
Aristo of Chios. See, Mayer 1994:44.  
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ways, Horace maintained his moral freedom in his own encounters with the rich.49 
Johnson goes further and argues that Aristippus’s adaptability was not only 
morally acceptable behaviour but required by decorum: ‘The capacity to shift, to 
take up and lay down public persona at the proper moment, as decorum requires, is 
a sign of versatility but also a sign of tolerance, acceptance of reality, common 
sense and even of humility’.50  
Nevertheless, when in Epistle 15 Horace conceded to being content with a 
little only when he had little, while aspiring for more once his means would allow 
it, he stated that this trait made him equal to the parasite Maenius rather than to the 
philosopher Aristippus. Aristippus’s own moral freedom is highly doubtful: Horace 
describes him as someone content with what he had (26), supposedly to indicate 
his moral freedom, but has him refer to himself as a ‘scurra for his own benefit’.  
If the scurra was in any sense morally free he would no longer be a scurra and 
Aristippus’s blunt admission of self-centeredness is particularly difficult to 
reconcile with his supposed moral freedom. In the ancient ethical treatises, the true 
amicus was characterised primarily by his selfless concern for the welfare of his 
friend, while the self-centredness of the scurra made him incapable of engaging in 
true friendship and was often the chief indicator of his moral corruption.51 
Aristippus’s admission even recalls the scurra Mulvius of Serm. 2.7, who in a 
characteristic display of the comic parasite’s professional pride boasted of his 
inability or unwillingness to be a true friend.52 In any case, as the epistle 
progresses, it becomes apparent that Aristippus was less important to Horace as an 
exemplar of a morally free client than as an exemplar of a successful client who 
appeared as such. The advice Horace offers to Scaeva in the lines below comes 
across as a somewhat Machiavellian reformulation of the honourable principles 
expressed in the Sermones: there, the truly honourable client is uninterested in 
gifts, whilst here the truly successful client appears as such (1.17.43-45):53   
  
Coram rege sua de paupertate tacentes 
plus poscente ferent. Distat sumasne pudenter 
an rapias: atqui rerum caput hoc erat, hic fons. 
 
                                                     
49
  ‘Horace felt a kinship with Aristippus in the internal freedom that he maintained in his 
encounters with his powerful protector’, Pohlenz in Traina 2009:307. 
50
  Johnson 1993:104. 
51
  As Konstan 1995:334 observes: ‘Aristotle’s definition of friendship ― mutual good will 
and selfless regard for the other ― continued to inform the literature regarding bonds 
between unequal partners’.  
52
  Damon 1997:112-125.  
53
  Oliensis 1998:170. 
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Clients who don’t tell their patrons how poor they are, get more than 
beggars do. And it is important to accept, not grab. That’s the trick, 
the key to this whole business. 
Horace reinforces this point with the image of a foolish, noisy animal: ‘If a crow 
could eat his meal in silence, he’d get more when he found food, and with far less 
bitterness and fuss’ (sed tacitus pasci si posset coruus, haberet / plus dapis et rixae 
multo minus inuidiaeque, 50-51). A second example illustrates the unseemly 
behaviour of the client who accompanies his patron on a journey but complains at 
all times about the road, weather and his expenses. Horace compares him to a 
prostitute who wails at her pretended losses (52-57).  
So, ‘the right way’ to keep company with powerful men, ‘the key to the 
whole business’, is to maintain the appearance of an honourable client: go after 
gifts but avoid appearing like you do.54 The advice Horace offers to Scaeva, in 
short, is to become the sort of scurra considered by the ethical treatises to be the 
more subtle and, to the superior party, the more dangerous sort.55 As for Aristippus, 
it is important to notice that Horace approved of his ways while advising his friend 
how to be a smart client rather than how to be a free client, or on how to profit 
from such a relationship while maintaining an aura of respectability by appearing 
free, morally or otherwise. For Aristippus to appear in this context as someone 
worthy of emulation indicates that he played this game well.  
It is sometimes asserted that the virtue Aristippus and Horace aimed for in 
one’s life and social relations resided in balance or in the mean between two 
extremes. Indeed, in line 9 of the following epistle (1.18), Horace writes: ‘Virtue is 
the mean between vices, remote from both extremes’ (virtus est medium vitiorum 
utrimque reductum, 18. 9). In this epistle, Horace professes to advise his young 
friend Lollius on how to maintain a balance between servile compliance and willful 
independence, but in actuality only goes on to demonstrate the impossibility of 
achieving it. As such this epistle goes a step further in showing that the scurra and 
the inferior amicus are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, and that the chief 
value of such and similar philosophical precepts lay in reinterpreting the moral 
compromises necessitated by their existence as adaptability, versatility, ‘common 
sense or even humility’.    
Lollius, as Horace portrays him in Epistle 18, is a man of independent 
streak who tends to avoid friendship with the rich for fear of losing his 
independence. In the opening lines Horace states: ‘If I know you well, Lollius, 
                                                     
54
  For a different view, Kilpatrick 1986:47. 
55
  Cicero observed that flatterers and fakes who put on a pretense of virtue are far more 
dangerous than overt loudmouths; what distinguishes the flatterer from a true friend is 
not his manner of behaviour, but the level of insincerity behind it, Lael. 99. 
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being the most independent of men, you will be afraid to show the colours of a 
scurra when you have called yourself a friend’ (si bene te novi, metues liberrime 
Lolli, / scurrantis speciem praebere, professus amicum, 1-2). Lollius has an 
instinctive abhorrence to appearing as a scurra to someone to whom he has offered 
amicitia, and this makes his insertion into the system of patronage problematic ― 
he fears the loss of identity, the loss of a distinct self.56 Horace starts by making 
clear that the true amicus and scurra are polar opposites: ‘A wife in white is as 
different from a gaudy-coloured prostitute as a real friend is from a parasitic fake’ 
(ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque / discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus, 
18.2-4). The scurra is the fearful and sycophantic ‘yes-man’ whose performance 
determines future invitations (10-14) and, because Lollius would avoid such a role 
like the plague, Horace offers him advice in a supposedly middle way between 
servile subservience and boorish outspokenness (39-40, 44-48):  
 
Nec tua laudabis studia aut aliena reprendes 
nec cum venari volet ille, poemata panges  
… tu cede potentis amici. 
Lenibus imperiis quotiensque, educet in agros 
Aetolis onerata plagis iumenta canesque, 
surge et inhumanae senium depone Camenae, 
cenes ut pariter pulmenta laboribus empta. 
 
Don’t praise what interests you nor scorn what he enjoys, or sit 
around composing poems when he prefers to hunt … respect your 
friend’s position, accept his light commands. So when he is going to 
the fields and takes his dogs, his asses laden with Aetolian nets, get 
up, lay aside your melancholy, unsocial Muse and earn your food by 
work as strenuous as his.  
One is hard pressed to find anything of a middle way in the behaviour advised 
here. A hunting expedition such as Horace envisages here was the standard 
example of a flatterer’s willingness to follow his patron, while the short-term 
reward for his obedience ― food or dinner ― is another clear sign that the 
behaviour Horace advises here is that of a parasite.57 A few lines below, Horace 
advises Lollius further on how to adapt himself to the pursuits and character of his 
                                                     
56
  Bowditch 1994:415.  
57
  Plutarch, among others, provides an example from the realm of theory and Menander 
has a wealthy young man accompanied on such a trip by a parasite, Mor. 52b-c; Men. 
Dys. 39ff. 
HORACE, THE LIAR PERSONA AND POETRY OF DISSIMULATIO      71 
 
potens amicus, and in doing so obscures even further the already hazy boundary 
between an inferior amicus and a scurra (86-90):  
 
Dulcis inexpertis cultura potentis amici: 
expertus metuit. tu, dum tua navis in alto est, 
hoc age, ne mutata retrorsum te ferat aura. 
oderunt hilarem tristes tristemque iocosi, 
sedatum celeres, agilem nauumque remissi. 
 
Those who have never tried think it pleasant to court a friend in 
power: one who has tried dreads it. While your barque is on the 
deep, see to it lest the breeze shift and bare your back. The grave 
dislike the gay, the merry the grave, the quick the staid, the lazy the 
stirring man of action. 
Horace reminds Lollius that courting the great is a strenuous task primarily because 
it requires one to adapt to the character of a powerful friend; it involves 
suppressing one’s own personality in order to appear in a light the patron will find 
appealing. There is nothing respectable or ‘free’ about this type of adaptability; it is 
merely another name for dissimulatio, which in the extant ethical treatises was 
considered a sure mark of the parasite and flatterer.58 Horace goes further and 
emphasises the theatrics of this process by advising Lollius to draw on his 
experiences in playing characters when staging plays with his brother (59-64): 
 
Quamuis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque 
curas, interdum nugaris rure paterno. 
Partitur lintres exercitus, Actia pugna 
te duce per pueros hostili more refertur; 
adversarius est frater, lacus Hadria, donec  
alterutrum velox Victoria fronde coronet. 
 
Yes I know you never lie or counterfeit emotions, but you play 
around at times, out on your father’s farm. Opposing sides divide the 
rowboats, and Actium is fought again: you lead your slaves in battle 
order; your brother is the foe, your pond the Adriatic, till winged 
Victory arrives, bringing one of you a leafy crown.  
Horace here refers to Lollius and his brother re-enacting the battle of Actium, 
emphasising that the pretence involved in this process is of the same sort the client 
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  Cic. Amic. 93; Plut. Mor. 52b-d; Hunter 1985:484. 
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requires if he is to be successful in courting his patron. The world of patronal 
relations, Horace implies, is a world of make-believe, and it is up to the client to 
keep it as such if he wishes to benefit from the system. 
Jacques Perret has referred to Epistles 17 and 18 as ars parasitandi (‘a 
handbook for parasites’) and quite rightly so, as the advice they offer to their 
addressees is indeed on how to sidle up to the rich and famous in a discreet 
fashion.59 The task of cultivating the patron, these epistles make clear, involves 
engaging in behaviours that are clearly incompatible with the genuine 
independence and frankness that the ethical treatises considered a prerequisite for 
true friendship. What tends to obscure this picture is that Horace’s persona 
purports to have insight into the ‘right way’ of keeping company with powerful 
men both practically and morally speaking, while in fact delivering advice that 
clearly sidelines moral considerations in favour of the practical. He appears 
concerned with teaching young men how to maintain virtus in the role of 
dependent friend, but only gives advice on ways of profiting from the role; he 
establishes a clear divide between amicus and scurra only to reveal by his advice 
the impossibility of maintaining it. What obscures it, in short, is that Horace 
practises what he preaches and starts each poem with dissimulatio, or with the 
pretence necessary to maintain the theoretical divide between the inferior amicus 
and scurra. He then advises potential clients to maintain the divide between the 
two at the level of appearances; by knowing how to adopt an external demeanour 
of moral freedom and contentment while at the same time being likeable and 
providing entertaining company to one’s powerful friend. Such advice clearly 
justifies the title of ars parasitandi for these poems, and the designation of parasite 
for the voice of experience behind them. This voice has already admitted to being a 
scurra in Epistle 15 (nimirum hic ego sum, 15.42) and thus gave us an early 
warning that the virtuous teacher we are about to encounter might not be all he 
seems, and that he might indeed still be engaging in his old habit of dissimulatio.  
In Epistles I, Horace demolishes the credibility of the past literary versions 
of himself: the free amicus of Maecenas has become Maecenas’s slave in the very 
first lines of Epistle 1. Horace then starts to demolish the credibility of his present 
epistolary persona, by constructing it as the mask of a dissimulator, as the human 
face over the slave whom we have come to know as Davus’s Horace. As it strips 
away, this mask reveals itself as composed of theoretical and practical components: 
of convenient philosophical precepts backed by the correct social performance of 
the role of the true amicus. As I mentioned above, I believe that Horace devised his 
epistolary persona in order to allow the reader a glimpse behind his public and 
literary face. He wished the reader to see him as a man aware of the moral 
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compromises and various hypocrisies by which he paved his way to the social and 
poetic heights we find him at by 20 BC. It is, of course, possible that, in order to 
serve his artistic ends, Horace is here temporarily assuming the mask of a scurra 
over the true face of an amicus, rather than, as I argue, unmasking the amicus in 
order to reveal the true face of a scurra. My primary reasons for deciding against 
such a view are to be found in Epistle 20.   
Epistle 20 is addressed to the now complete volume of Epistles, which is 
cast in the figure of a pretty slave who longs to run away from Horace. The book 
wishes to publish itself, to make a fortune in the world by prostituting itself with 
the help of the Sosii brothers, booksellers here cast as pimps (20.1-5).60 While the 
mask appears to have been disposed of at this point, this is not the case, because 
Horace’s persona continues with its dissimulatio. In this poem, Horace the author 
dissociates his persona from the actual book and its subhuman state by portraying 
it as a separate entity that, being wiser, freer and more self-sufficient, disapproves 
of it and its lowly motives. Nevertheless, like before, this persona starts to 
undermine almost immediately its own claims to moral freedom by using the 
language of fable. The persona warns the slave / book about the dangers of 
prostituting oneself to the public by evoking as a cautionary exemplum the fable of 
the ass and the driver (20.14-16):61  
 
Ridebit monitor non exauditus ut ille 
qui male parentem in rupes protrusit asellum 
iratus; quis enim invitum servare laboret? 
 
Your guardian, his good advices all wasted, will laugh like the man 
whose donkey baulked until he grew so angry he shoved it off the 
cliff. Why try to save a stubborn ass? (trans. R Fairclough, p. 389). 
By employing the language of fable, Horace obliterates any distinction in status 
between the interlocutors; he reveals that the slave is addressing another slave, or 
to put it more accurately, that the slave is talking to himself. Dissimulatio 
continues to the very end; Horace does not unmask his persona but allows it to be 
defeated and defied by the book-slave: the persona gives up his efforts, releases the 
slave and instructs him to tell the world his story (20). Let us now stop and ask: 
who is he? Whose story will be told? Horace’s literary persona requested the story, 
so what reason do we have to think that that which follows will have any 
connection to an historical Horace? What follows is almost certainly historically 
accurate information about the author (21-28): 
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Me libertino natum patre et in tenui re 
maiores pennas nido extendisse loqueris 
ut quantum generi demas virtutibus addas; 
me primis urbis belli placuisse domique, 
  corporis exigui, praecanum, solibus aptum, 
irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem. 
forte meum siquis te percontabitur aeuum, 
me quater undenos sciat impleuisse Decembris, 
colllegam Lepidum quo duxit Lollius anno. 
 
I was a freedman’s son, and amid slender means spread wings too 
wide for my nest, thus adding to my merits what you take from my 
birth; say that I found favor both in war and peace with the foremost 
in the State; of small stature, gray before my time, fond of the sun, 
quick in temper, yet so as to be easily appeased. If one chance to 
inquire my age, let him know that I completed my forty-fourth 
December in the year when Lollius drew Lepidus for colleague.  
Few have found reason to question the historical accuracy of the information 
contained in these lines; the man described here is the historical Horatius Flaccus, 
the poet and amicus of Maecenas. By inserting this piece of straightforward and for 
the most part widely known autobiographical information, Horace the author 
makes a point of identifying himself with the dissimulating slave persona that has 
requested his story be told. I believe this to be the first indication that the ‘liar 
persona’ of Epistle 1 was there to represent Horace the author. The second 
indication is that this persona clearly transcends its genre and its time in history:  
it irreversibly ‘stains’ Horace’s past, present and future ‘poetic selves’. It exposes a 
slavish past, itself as a slave, and in Epistle 20 announces the resumption of 
Horace’s poetic career in unaltered ‘slavish’ terms. This, then, is the only 
permanent ‘self’ Horace has left us, the one he can never truly discard but only 
disguise by temporary masks. The third and final indication has to do with the 
Book’s own dissimulatio. By exposing Book 1 of Epistles as a slave anxious for 
publication, Horace ended its own dissimulatio; or its pretence to be a collection of 
personal and ‘sincere’ letters, while it was really a collection of poems intended for 
Maecenas. The Book’s dissimulatio was a crucial component in the liar persona’s 
own pretence and yet quite separate from it, as Epistle 20 clearly shows. By 
maintaining this transparent fiction, Horace the author ensures that, even if we 
choose to disassociate him from his liar persona, we can never separate him or his 
‘story’ from the slave that brought it to us, namely Book 1 of Epistles. To separate 
the author from this book, to disassociate him from the Book’s slavish need to 
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please the master, to be seen, read and admired, is to play the same game the 
author played when he disassociated his persona from it. This is a farce, Horace 
warns us, disguising the obvious fact that Maecenas requested his poems and he 
obeyed; he has Maecenas as a master because he himself obeys another master, his 
belly and all it represents.  
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